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Abstract 
 
Arguing that religious diversity creates incentives for political cooperation, recent research 
questions the assumption that religious diversity leads to more fragmented party systems and 
finds a negative association between religious diversity and the fragmentation of vote shares. 
Before this revisionist perspective can be believed, however, we need to observe the causal 
processes linking religious diversity and party system fragmentation. One of these is that 
religious diversity is negatively associated with the number of religious parties contesting 
elections. Using data counting the number of religious parties in elections around the world 
between 2011 and 2016, the analysis shows that religious diversity is negatively associated 
with the number of religious parties. In line with the revisionist perspective, these results 
suggest that religious diversity creates incentives for political cooperation that lead elites to 
cooperate across religious group lines in support of parties representing their shared political 
interests.  
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Most research examining the impact of social cleavages on the development of party 
systems assumes that higher levels of social diversity lead to the development of more parties 
and greater fragmentation of votes across these parties. Drawing on the seminal conclusion 
from Lipset and Rokkan (1967) that the number of parties is determined by the number of 
cleavages, most research assumes (implicitly or explicitly) that greater levels of diversity lead 
to more parties. Accordingly, most studies examining the impact of social cleavages on party 
systems have found that measures of social diversity are associated with more fragmented 
party systems (e.g. Ordeshook and Shvetsova 1994; Amorim Neto and Cox 1997; Clark and 
Golder 2006; Singer and Stephenson 2009).  
Although few cross-national studies have examined the impact of religion per se on 
party system fragmentation,
1
 some previous research suggests that religious diversity may be 
positively associated with party system fragmentation in the same way as other measures of 
social diversity are. Not only have religious cleavages been important for the development of 
religious parties in many democracies in Western Europe (Kalyvas 1996; Caramani 2004; 
Ertman 2009), but religious cleavages have had important effects on the development of party 
systems in other countries as well (e.g. Evans 2006; Mainwaring and Scully 2003; McAllister 
2007). Because religious cleavages in several countries have produced and sustained religious 
parties that compete for religious voters’ support, most research assumes that religious 
diversity should produce more fragmented party systems in the same way that other forms of 
social diversity have been shown to produce more fragmented party systems.  
In contrast to the assumption that religious diversity produces more fragmented party 
systems, other research argues that religious diversity is negatively associated with the 
fragmentation of the party system (Raymond 2016). This argument holds that religious 
                                               
1
 The majority of studies that do examine the impact of religion on party system 
fragmentation do so as part of composite measures of social diversity that effectively assume 
the effects of religion on party systems are similar to those of other measures of social 
diversity (e.g. Lijphart 1999; Stoll 2013).  
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diversity creates incentives for religious groups to cooperate politically. Building on the 
‘supply-side religiosity’ literature regarding the competition of religious groups in a market 
for adherents (Finke and Stark 1988; Iannaccone, Finke, and Stark 1997; Stark and 
Iannaccone 1994), this research argues that in more diverse contexts where competition is 
most intense, religious groups will cooperate to support parties representing their shared issue 
concerns in order to preserve resources that can be more effectively spent competing for 
religious adherents. Instead of dividing their support across multiple parties representing 
issues rooted in religious cleavages, religious voters will concentrate their support on the 
party with the best chance of implementing favorable policies—even if this means 
abandoning parties explicitly formed to represent religious voters in favor of a secular party 
willing to trade policy in exchange for religious voters’ support. Due the incentives for 
political cooperation, this research argues that higher levels of religious diversity will be 
associated with lower levels of party system fragmentation.  
Before this revisionist perspective regarding the impact of religious diversity on party 
system fragmentation can be considered further, however, further research examining the 
testable propositions underpinning the argument is needed. In particular, we should be able to 
observe that religious diversity actually induces political cooperation (i.e. a reduction in the 
number of religious parties) if the purported relationship between religious diversity and 
party system fragmentation is indeed genuine. As this revised perspective argues, a 
diversifying religious structure reduces the size—and therefore political influence—of each 
religious group. Because religious groups competing in a market for adherents have to think 
first and foremost about their ability to attract and maintain religious adherents (per the 
supply-side religiosity literature), religious groups in diverse contexts—where competition 
for adherents is greater, thus limiting the resources available to devote to politics—may be 
less likely to field their own religious parties than religious groups in less diverse contexts. 
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Instead, religious groups in diverse contexts—like other organizations in competitive markets 
(van de Ven 1976; Miller 2002)—will seek to preserve resources that can be spent in the 
religious marketplace by cooperating with other religious groups sharing similar political 
interests in support of a smaller number of religious party organizations appealing across 
religious group lines. In the most diverse contexts, religious groups may abandon religious 
party organizations altogether and instead support parties not affiliated specifically with 
religion in exchange for policies favorable to the religious groups (e.g. issues of morality, 
favorable state-church relations, etc.) because these non-religious parties are more electorally 
viable—and therefore more likely to control government and enact policy. Thus, if religious 
diversity leads to political cooperation across religious group lines as this revisionist 
perspective argues, then we should observe that religious diversity is negatively associated 
with the number of religious parties contesting elections.  
To determine whether this revisionist perspective regarding the impact of religious 
diversity on party system development and fragmentation has merit, this study examines the 
relationship between religious diversity and the number of religious parties in countries 
around the world.  Using an original data set including all national-level legislative elections 
around the world between 2011 and 2016, I estimate this relationship after controlling for 
several alternative explanations of party development. If religious diversity is negatively 
associated with the number of religious parties contesting elections, then we would have 
evidence to support the argument that religious diversity puts downward pressure on the 
fragmentation of the party system. If, however, religious diversity has no effect on the 
number of religious parties (or if it is positively associated with the number of parties), then 
we would need to reconsider the merits of the revisionist perspective.  
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Measuring Religious Parties 
To test the argument that religious diversity reduces the number of religious parties, I 
produced a data set collecting the number of religious parties competing in elections in 
territories around the world. Specifically, I examined all legislative elections (focusing on the 
lower house in bicameral legislatures) held in autonomous or semi-autonomous territories 
between 2011 and 2016. Because several countries held more than one election during this 
period, the resulting data set is comprised of country-elections (rather than countries as the 
units of analysis). I focus on country-elections during these years (and not earlier years) to 
ensure the quality of the data collection: while it would have been preferable to collect data 
for a longer time series, information about all parties competing in each election is hard to 
come by in some countries, even in some long-established democracies. By restricting the 
data collection to more recent years in which the information necessary to account for all 
significant religious parties contesting elections is available, I sacrifice quantity of data for 
the more important quality of reliable measurement.  
To produce this data set, I first had to define what constitutes a religious party. Until 
recently, the concept of ‘religious parties’ had not been defined clearly in the literature. While 
some particular parties have been defined and classified (e.g. Bick 2001; Hansen and Jaffrelot 
2001), general terminology with cross-national applicability had been until recently harder to 
come by. To be sure, research by von Beyme (1985; see also Kalyvas 1996; Kalyvas and van 
Kesbergen 2010) identified Christian Democratic parties as a separate party ‘family’ that was 
distinct from parties of both the left and right representing secular issues, while Kircheimer 
(1966) identified ‘mass-denominational’ parties representing particular religious groups as a 
separate type of the mass party model.
2
 Recent work by Ozzano (2013) has combined and 
expanded on these insights to define five types of religious parties based on clearer, more 
                                               
2
 More recent research by Gunther and Diamond (2003) divided religious denominational 
parties further into those supportive of/opposed to political pluralism. 
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systematic grounds: parties’ ideologies (including their attitudes towards political pluralism), 
organization, goals, and social/interest group bases of support.  
To operationalize the notion of ‘religious parties’ in a way that distinguishes religious 
parties (which are the focus of the arguments of the revisionist perspective regarding the 
relationship between religious diversity and party system fragmentation in Raymond 2016) 
from other parties that merely speak to issues concerning religious voters (to which the 
revisionist perspective does not speak directly), the present study uses those features seen in 
Ozzano to identify religious parties. To identify religious parties, I focus in particular on the 
most tangible aspects: their ideologies, organization, goals, and the social bases they target in 
their appeals to voters and related interest groups. Specifically, I defined a religious party as 
any party whose organizational or issue/ideological profile is defined explicitly by religion. 
This definition serves to distinguish parties formed explicitly to represent religious groups, 
voters, and issues from non-religious parties that may represent issues of concern to religious 
voters but whose existence is not defined explicitly by religion.  
Parties were classified as religious parties if they met any one of the following 
criteria. First, any party including a reference to the religion represented by the party in their 
name (e.g. ‘Christian Democrat’ parties) was treated as a religious party. The inclusion of the 
religion represented by the party in its name serves as an important signal to voters belonging 
to a relevant social group (i.e. voters belonging to the particular religion represented by the 
party) that the party represents their values and interests—and is organized to do so before, 
during, and after elections. Second, any party belonging to an international religious 
organization (e.g. the Muslim Brotherhood or the Centrist [Christian] Democrat International) 
was classified as a religious party organization.  
Third, parties were designated as religious parties if they belong to a religious party 
family. I used three sources to identify whether parties belonged to a religious party family: 
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the Comparative Manifesto Project (Budge et al. 2001; Klingemann et al. 2006), the Chapel 
Hill Expert Survey (Bakker et al. 2015; Polk et al. 2017), and the Parties and Elections in 
Europe database (Nordsieck 2017). If a party was recognized as belonging to a religious party 
family by any one of these three sources, I treated the party as a religious party organization.  
As a final means of determining whether a party was a religious party or not, I 
consulted parties’ websites. Where such websites were available, I treated parties identifying 
the representation of religious issues and/or identities as fundamental to the organization and 
goals of the party—rather than merely a set of issues supported by the party—as religious 
party organizations. The former rationale explains why parties like the Slovak National Party 
in Slovakia (which identifies the protection of traditional Christian values as an essential 
component of the party’s nationalistic mission) are treated as religious party organizations, 
while parties like the Republican Party in the United States (which is, formally, a secular 
party whose platform merely supports issues of concern to many religious voters but is not 
organized explicitly for the purpose of representing particular religious issues or identities) is 
not.  
A final note regarding the criteria applied to pre-electoral coalitions is in order. I 
treated parties as separate religious party organizations only if their vote and/or seat totals 
were reported separately from their coalition partners in official election reports. Keeping a 
distinct identity within the coalition is important for a party to be recognized by potential 
supporters, and thus parties whose religious identities are subsumed under a broader coalition 
identity alongside non-religious parties were usually treated as non-religious parties. In 
exception to this rule, pre-electoral coalitions are treated as religious parties only if one of 
two criteria was met. First, if the coalition is led by a religious party, the coalition is treated 
as religious. Second, a coalition is treated as a religious party/coalition if the majority of its 
member parties would be treated as religious parties according to the criteria listed above.  
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Table 1 about here 
Following the practice of research examining market concentration (e.g. Bain 1956; 
Kwoka 1981), I count the number of religious parties finishing in the top ten positions in each 
election. Focusing on the number of parties finishing in the top ten positions is preferable to 
trying to count the total number of religious parties in each election because most countries 
do not publish results identifying every party in every election. In addition to the problem of 
finding the total number of parties competing in every election, finding reliable information 
needed to determine which parties qualify as religious parties and which do not—even during 
the recent period studied here—is much more difficult for parties finishing outside the top ten 
positions. Thus, to ensure the reliability of the coding of religious versus non-religious 
parties, I focus on counting the number of religious parties among the top-ten parties in each 
election. While there is a concern that focusing on the top ten parties might introduce an 
arbitrary cutoff point, counting the number of religious parties using other cutoff points 
yielded similar results.
3
  
Figure 1 displays the percentages of country-elections at each value of the number of 
religious parties. There is a clear right skew to the distribution of religious parties in the 
country-elections examined here. The plurality number of religious parties is zero; at the 
other end of the scale, only a few countries feature more than three religious parties. This 
demonstrates that many countries do not feature any religious parties. That being said, the 
majority of countries feature at least one religious party, with some featuring more than one 
religious party, which means there is important variation in the number (including the 
absence) of religious parties to explain.  
                                               
3
 To ensure that the results are not due to the choice of ten as the number of positions in 
which to count the number of religious parties, I also examined the number of religious 
parties finishing in the top four, five, and eight positions in each election. The results using 
these alternative measures of the dependent variable produced similar results regarding the 
impact of religious diversity.  
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Figure 1 about here 
 
Estimating the Effect of Religious Diversity on the Number of Religious Parties 
I estimate the relationship between religious diversity and the number of religious 
parties around the world by including variables measuring the effective number of religious 
groups. This index takes the following form:  
1/Σgi
2
,  
where g represents the proportion of citizens belonging to the i
th
 religious group. Higher 
values of this index reflect more religiously diverse countries.  
To measure religious diversity, I use data from the Pew Research Center (2014). This 
data set includes the following religious groups into which respondents were grouped: 
Christian, Muslim, Hindu, Buddhist, Jewish, folk religions, unaffiliated, and other. To 
provide for further nuance in the measurement of religious groups, I supplement this data set 
with data breaking the Christian populations of each country down according to Protestants, 
Catholics, Orthodox, and ‘Other Christian’ (Pew 2011). In addition to the nuance in this 
measurement of religious groups this particular measure provides, the Pew data measures 
religious diversity in nearly every country and territory around the world. 
To determine the robustness of the findings using this measure, I also examine several 
alternative measures of religious diversity. A second measure of religious diversity is taken 
from Alesina et al. (2003). Four additional measures are taken from the World Christian 
Encyclopedia (now World Christian Database, or WCD: see Johnson and Zurlo 2007). WCD 
data are available for four years: 1900, 1970, 2000, and 2010, allowing us to analyze the 
long-term effects of religious diversity on the number of religious parties. Data for 1900, 
1970, and 2000 are taken from McCleary (2017); data for 2010 are taken from the 
Association of Religion Data Archives (www.TheARDA.com). Each of these alternative 
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measures of religious diversity is transformed into an effective number of religious groups.
4
  
I include several control variables to account for the prominent alternative 
explanations of variation in the number of religious parties. One set of variables measures the 
impact of electoral systems on the number of religious parties. Because previous research 
finds that the number of parties contesting elections is higher in countries with larger district 
magnitudes (i.e. the number of seats elected per district: see Hug 2001; Tavits 2006), I 
include a variable measuring the logged mean district magnitude in the lowest tier of the 
country’s electoral system.5 To account for the impact of proportional upper tiers—which 
might lead to more religious parties contesting elections due to the fact that proportional 
upper tiers reduce barriers to party success (Amorim Neto and Cox 1997; Clark and Golder 
2006)—I include a variable measuring countries where the percentage of seats elected in an 
upper tier is greater than/equal to 50 percent. Drawing from Duverger (1963), who noted that 
political parties face few barriers to entering the first round of two-round majority systems, 
we might also expect to see that the number of religious parties is greater in two-round 
majority systems than other electoral systems electing representatives in single-member 
districts (e.g. first-past-the-post). Countries using two-round majority systems are coded one 
                                               
4
 The data from Alesina et al. are reported as fractionalization scores ranging from 0 to 1. To 
transform these into effective numbers of religious groups, I use the following formula: 
1/(1-F) 
where F refers to the fractionalization scores reported by Alesina et al. The data taken from 
the WCD are reported as the percentages belonging to the following groups: Christian, 
Jewish, Muslim, Hindu, Buddhist, those belonging to several East Asian religions 
(Shintoism, Taoism, Chinese Universalism), the non-religious (atheists, agnostics, and 
otherwise non-religious), and all other religions. Religious diversity using WCD data is 
transformed into an effective number of religious groups in the same way as the Pew 
measure.  
5
 While recent research casts doubt on the possibility that the effects of social diversity on 
party system fragmentation interact with the permissiveness of the electoral system (Ferree et 
al. 2017; Milazzo et al. 2018), other research examining the fragmentation of vote/seat shares 
suggests that the effects of electoral systems and social diversity are conditional on the 
impact of each other variable (Ordeshook and Shvetsova 1994; Amorim Neto and Cox 1997; 
Clark and Golder 2006). In keeping with recent literature, model fit tests showed that most 
models interacting religious diversity and district magnitude did not significantly improve 
model fit relative to the models presented here.  
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(and zero otherwise). Data for these variables are taken from the Inter-Parliamentary Union’s 
Parline database and electionguide.org.  
Two control variables account for alternative explanations rooted in countries’ 
religious structures. To rule out the possibility that the negative relationship between 
religious diversity and religious party formation and success are due not to the impact of 
religious diversity but instead to the impact of state support for religion, I include a variable 
measuring countries where the state supports established religion(s). This variable is coded 
one for countries where the state officially supports religion(s) and zero otherwise, using data 
taken from Fox and Flores (2009; see also Fox 2011, 2014). Additionally, because religious 
parties might be less likely to form in more secular societies—because the share of voters 
concerned with religious issues is smaller in more secular societies—I include a variable 
measuring the non-religious percentage of the population.
6
  
I include three additional control variables. I include a measure of ethnic diversity—
measuring the effective number of ethnic groups
7—to account for the possibility that parties 
organized expressly along religious lines are less likely to form in ethnically diverse countries 
(where parties instead form around ethnic identities that may overlap with religious 
identities). To account for the possibility that wealthier societies—where the financial 
resources needed to organize parties are more readily available than in less wealthy 
societies—might be more likely to sustain (religious) parties, I include a variable measuring 
the logged per capita gross domestic product (GDP) of the country averaged over the five-
year period between 2006 and 2010. Data for this variable are taken from World Bank 
(2017). Finally, to account for the possibility that the number of religious parties is lower in 
                                               
6
 The measure used here is the ‘unaffiliated’ percentage reported by Pew (2014). However, 
the results are robust to the use of the percentages of non-religious citizens recorded in the 
WCD.  
7
 This measure uses data from Alesina et al. (2003) and is calculated in the same way as with 
religious diversity.  The results are robust to the use of alternative measures of ethnic 
diversity—e.g. the measure produced by Fearon (2003).   
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non-democratic versus democratic elections, I include the combined Polity measure of 
democracy (subtracting the autocracy from democracy scores: Marshall and Jaggers 2017).  
 
Analysis 
I estimate six models, one for each measure of religious diversity using Poisson 
regression.
8
 Because several countries in the period under study conducted multiple elections, 
I cluster standard errors by country. Parameter estimates for each model predicting the 
number of religious parties finishing in the top-ten places are presented in Table 2.  
Table 2 about here 
In keeping with the revisionist perspective regarding the impact of religious diversity 
on party system fragmentation, all six coefficients for the variables measuring religious 
diversity are negatively signed—suggesting that religious diversity leads to fewer religious 
parties contesting elections. With the exception of the coefficient for the WCD measure of 
religious diversity in 1900, each of these coefficients is statistically different from zero. The 
fact that the coefficients in models 3-6 become progressively stronger and more precisely 
estimated as one moves from the earliest to the most recent year of measurement suggests the 
possibility that the number of religious parties fluctuates over time in response to changing 
levels of religious diversity—with increasing levels of religious diversity reducing the 
number of religious parties. As the measurement of religious diversity increases in temporal 
proximity to the measure of the number of religious parties, the estimated effect religious 
diversity strengthens, suggesting that the number of religious parties contesting elections may 
respond to changes in the diversity of the religious market. In any event, the fact that several 
measures of religious diversity are negatively associated with the number of religious parties 
demonstrates the robustness of this relationship.   
                                               
8
 Results using negative binomial regression do not indicate problems of overdispersion, 
demonstrating that negative binomial regression models are unnecessary.   
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The coefficients measuring the impact of religious diversity on the number of 
religious parties reach statistical significance despite the fact that several control variables are 
also significantly associated with the number of religious parties. For instance, the positive 
coefficients associated with the variable measuring district magnitude suggest that religious 
parties are more likely to form in countries using electoral systems that are more favorable to 
the formation of new parties—religious or secular. The negative coefficients associated with 
the variable measuring ethnic diversity suggest that religious parties are less likely to form in 
ethnically diverse countries than countries with more homogeneous populations. 
Additionally, the positive coefficients associated with the variable measuring countries’ 
levels of democracy suggest religious parties are more likely to form in democracies—and 
less likely to form in non-democracies. Even after controlling for these variables, however, 
the fact that religious diversity remains negatively and significantly associated with the 
number of religious parties in each model (save model 3) further demonstrates the robustness 
of this finding.  
To see the substantive impact of religious diversity more clearly, Figure 2 presents the 
predicted number of religious parties contesting elections across the range of each measure of 
religious diversity. To generate these predicted values, I hold all control variables at their 
median values. The predicted values in Figure 2 demonstrate that the estimated number of 
religious parties decreases from roughly 1.5 religious parties in countries with the lowest 
levels of religious diversity to fewer than one religious party.  In many cases, the estimated 
number of religious parties at the highest levels of religious diversity is statistically 
indistinguishable from zero—and in every case, the estimated values at high levels of 
religious diversity suggest the chances of even one religious party contesting elections are 
low. To put it another way, the results in Figure 2 suggest that while one or two religious 
parties with the potential to finish in the top-ten positions might contest elections in 
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religiously homogeneous countries, religious parties are unlikely to contest elections in the 
most religiously diverse contexts.  
Figure 2 about here 
Thus, the results presented here support the revisionist perspective regarding the 
impact of religious diversity on party systems. In keeping with the argument that religious 
diversity puts downward pressure on the number of religious parties by compelling religious 
groups to cooperate on issues of shared interest to maximize their political impact (while 
preserving scarce resources that can be spent on competition for adherents in the religious 
marketplace), religious diversity is negatively associated with the number of religious parties 
in all six models estimated here. The fact this relationship holds when using different 
measures of religious diversity and even after controlling for several alternative hypotheses 
demonstrates that this relationship is quite robust.  
 
Conclusion 
This study began by noting a recent controversy that has emerged in the literature 
regarding the impact of religious diversity on party system fragmentation. Most research 
assumes that religious diversity—like other forms of social diversity—creates conditions for 
party systems to fragment, especially considering that religious cleavages have led to the 
formation of several parties representing these cleavages. In contrast to this perspective, 
however, other research (Raymond 2016) argues that religious diversity creates incentives for 
political cooperation across religious lines that puts downward pressure on party system 
fragmentation. Before considering this revisionist argument further, however, we would need 
to see evidence of the other testable implications underpinning the argument that religious 
diversity reduces party system fragmentation. Chiefly, we should observe that religious 
diversity limits the number of parties contesting elections to represent religious voters and 
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their interests.  
In line with the revisionist perspective, the analysis of the number of religious parties 
contesting elections performed here suggests that religious diversity is indeed negatively 
associated with the number of religious parties. Though several other variables are also 
associated with the number of religious parties, the fact remains that the negative association 
between religious diversity and the number of religious parties cannot be explained by these 
alternative hypotheses. In contrast to the expectation that diversity breeds discord which 
prevents political cooperation, these results support the conclusion reached in earlier research 
arguing that religious diversity promotes political cooperation which leads to a reduction in 
the number of religious parties.  
Though the findings presented above support the revisionist perspective regarding the 
impact of religious diversity on party system fragmentation, it remains to be seen whether the 
predictions of this revisionist argument regarding the voting behavior of religious groups are 
met. As religious diversity increases, this argument predicts that religious parties become less 
viable because religious groups begin cooperating politically in support of the same parties 
on the basis of shared interests. However, it remains to be seen whether the negative 
association between religious diversity and the fragmentation of votes across parties is due 
solely to a reduction in the number of parties, or whether religious diversity impacts the 
behavior of voters as well. To this end, additional research examining the voting behavior of 
individuals is needed to evaluate the revisionist perspective.  
One other important area for future research regards the impact of religious diversity 
on the representation of religious issues. If the results above suggesting that religious parties 
are less likely to form in diverse contexts are correct, this raises questions about how—and to 
what extent—religious issues are represented by parties not explicitly formed around 
religious identities and issues. The results presented here raise questions about how much 
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representation is given to the concerns of religious voters in religiously diverse societies 
without religious parties. One might expect that explicit discussion of religious issues may be 
less common in religiously diverse societies where religious groups cooperate to support 
parties not formed around religion than in countries featuring religious parties because non-
religious parties need to appeal to voters concerned with a broader range of concerns than 
those dealing with religion. It may be that religious leaders in diverse societies might need to 
accept freedom from state regulation of religion—instead of the ability to shape morality 
policies in favor of one’s religious preferences—as the biggest reward for their support of 
parties not formed exclusively to represent religious issues. However, the degree to which 
morality issues become partisan issues in countries without religious parties—such as 
Australia—suggests the possibility that the presence of religious parties is not necessary for 
issues concerning religious voters to be represented in political debates (c.f. Hurka, Knill, and 
Rivière 2017). Thus, future research will also be needed to determine the consequences of 
religious diversity for the representation of religious issues.  
 
Table 1: List of Religious Parties Finishing in the Top Ten Places by Country and Election Year, 2011-2016 
 
Country (Election Years)  Religious Parties 
Albania (2013)   Democratic Party of Albania 
Algeria (2012)   National Rally for Democracy; Green Algeria Alliance; Justice and Development Party 
Andorra (2011)   N/A 
Andorra (2015)   N/A 
Angola (2012)    National Union for the Total Independence of Angola; National Liberation Front of Angola 
Antigua and Barbuda (2014)  N/A 
Argentina (2011)   Front for Victory; Popular Union 
Argentina (2013)   Justicialist Party; Renewal Front 
Argentina (2015)   Front for Victory; Renewal Front 
Armenia (2012)   Republican Party; Armenian Renaissance 
Aruba (2013)    Aruban People’s Party 
Australia (2013)   N/A 
Austria (2013)    Austrian People’s Party; Christian Party of Austria 
Azerbaijan (2015)   N/A 
Bahamas (2012)   N/A 
Bahrain (2014)   Al Asalah; Al-Menbar Islamic Society; Al Wefaq 
Bangladesh (2014)   N/A 
Barbados (2013)   N/A 
Belarus (2012)   Belarusian Popular Front Party 
Belgium (2014)   Christian Democratic and Flemish; Humanist Democratic Centre 
Belize (2012)    People’s United Party 
Belize (2015)    People’s United Party 
Benin (2011)    N/A 
Benin (2015)    N/A 
Bermuda (2012)   N/A 
Bhutan (2013)    N/A 
Bolivia (2014)    Christian Democratic Party 
Bosnia-Herzegovina (2014) Party of Democratic Action; Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatian Democratic 
Union 1990 
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Botswana (2014)   N/A 
Brazil (2014) Progressive Party; Brazilian Social Democracy Party; Republic Party; Brazilian Republican Party; 
Democrats 
Bulgaria (2013)   Movement for Rights and Freedoms; Attack; National Front for the Salvation of Bulgaria;   
     IMRO-Bulgarian National Movement 
Bulgaria (2014)   Movement for Rights and Freedoms; Attack 
Burkina Faso (2012)   Union for the Republic 
Burkina Faso (2015)   N/A 
Burundi (2015)   N/A 
Cambodia (2013) Cambodian People’s Party; Front uni national pour un Cambodge indépendant, neutre, pacifique et 
coopératif 
Cameroon (2013)   N/A 
Canada (2011)   Christian Heritage 
Canada (2011)   Christian Heritage 
Cayman Islands (2013)  N/A 
Central African Republic (2011) N/A 
Central African Republic (2015) N/A 
Chile (2013)    Christian Democratic Party 
Colombia (2014)   Colombian Conservative Party 
Comoros (2015)   N/A 
Congo, Republic of (2012)  N/A 
Costa Rica (2014)   Citizens’ Action Party; Social Christian Unity Party; National Restoration Party; Costa Rican   
     Renovation Party 
Côte D’Ivoire (2011)   Rally of the Republicans 
Croatia (2011)    Croatian Democratic Union; Croatian Peasant Party 
Croatia (2015)    Patriotic Coalition 
Croatia (2016)    Croatian Democratic Union Coalition 
Cyprus (2011)    Democratic Rally 
Czechia (2013)   Top 09; Christian and Democratic Union-Czechoslovak People’s Party 
Denmark (2011)   Christian Democrats 
Denmark (2015)   Christian Democrats 
Djibouti (2013)   N/A 
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Dominica (2014)   N/A 
Dominican Republic (2016)  Social Christian Reformist Party; Quisqueyano Christian Democratic Party 
Ecuador (2013)   Social Christian Party 
Egypt (2011)    Democratic Alliance For Egypt; Islamist Bloc; Al-Wasat Party 
Egypt (2015)    Al-Nour Party 
El Salvador (2012)   Party of Hope; Party of Hope-National Conciliation Party 
El Salvador (2015)   Christian Democratic Party; National Conciliation Party-Christian Democratic Party 
Equatorial Guinea (2013)  N/A 
Estonia (2011)   Pro Patria and Res Publica Union; Party of Estonian Christian Democrats 
Estonia (2015)   Pro Patria and Res Publica Union 
Ethiopia (2015)   N/A 
Faroe Islands (2011)    Centre Party 
Faroe Islands (2015)    Centre Party 
Fiji (2014)    Social Democratic Liberal Party 
Finland (2011)   Christian Democrats 
Finland (2015)   Christian Democrats 
France (2012)    Union for a Popular Movement 
Gabon (2011)    Gabonese Democratic Party 
Gambia, The (2012)   N/A 
Georgia (2012)   Christian Democratic Union 
Georgia (2016)   N/A 
Germany (2013)   Christian Democratic Party; Christian Social Union 
Ghana (2012)    N/A 
Ghana (2016)    N/A 
Greece (2012, May)   New Democracy; Independent Greeks; Golden Dawn; Popular Orthodox Rally 
Greece (2012, June) New Democracy; Independent Greeks; Popular Association-Golden Dawn; Popular Orthodox Rally 
Greece (2015, January)  New Democracy; Independent Greeks; Golden Dawn 
Greece (2015, September)  New Democracy; Popular Association-Golden Dawn; Independent Greeks-National Patriotic   
     Alliance 
Greenland (2013)   N/A 
Greenland (2014)   N/A 
Grenada (2013)   N/A 
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Guatemala (2011)   National Unity of Hope 
Guatemala (2015)   National Unity of Hope 
Guinea (2013)    N/A 
Guinea-Bissau (2014)   Party for Social Renewal 
Guyana (2011)   N/A 
Guyana (2015)   N/A 
Haiti (2015)    Christian Movement for a New Haiti 
Honduras (2013)   National Party; Christian Democratic Party 
Hong Kong (2012)   N/A 
Hong Kong (2016)   N/A 
Hungary (2014)   Fidesz-Christian Democratic People’s Party; Jobbik 
Iceland (2013)    N/A 
Iceland (2016)    N/A 
India (2014) India (2014)    Bharatiya Janata Party; Shiv Sena; Shiromani Akali Dal; Indian Union Muslim League 
Indonesia (2014)   National Mandate Party; National Awakening Party; Prosperous Justice Party; United   
     Development Party 
Ireland (2011)    Fine Gael 
Ireland (2016)    Fine Gael 
Isle of Man (2011)   N/A 
Isle of Man (2016)   N/A 
Israel (2013)    The Jewish Home; Shas; United Torah Judaism; United Arab List 
Israel (2015)    The Jewish Home; Shas; United Torah Judaism 
Italy (2013)    Democratic Party; The People of Freedom; Lega Nord 
Jamaica (2011)   N/A 
Japan (2012)    New Komeito Party 
Japan (2014)    New Komeito Party 
Kazakhstan (2012)   N/A 
Kazakhstan (2016)   N/A 
Kenya (2013)    Wiper Democratic Movement 
Kiribati (2011)   N/A 
Kiribati (2015)   N/A 
Kosovo (2014)   N/A 
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Kuwait (2012, February)  Sunni Islamist 
Kuwait (2013)    Sunni Islamist 
Kyrgyzstan (2015)   N/A 
Latvia (2011)    N/A 
Latvia (2014)    N/A 
Lesotho (2012)   N/A 
Lesotho (2015)   N/A 
Liberia (2011)    N/A 
Liberia (2014)    N/A 
Liechtenstein (2013)   Patriotic Union 
Lithuania (2012)   Homeland Union; Electoral Actions of Poles in Lithuania 
Lithuania (2016)   Homeland Union – Lithuanian Christian Democrats; Electoral Actions of Poles in Lithuania 
Luxembourg (2013)   Christian Social People’s Party 
Macau (2013)    N/A 
Macedonia (2011)   Internal Macedonia Revolutionary Organization – Democratic Party for Macedonia National   
     Unity; Democratic Union for Integration; Internal Macedonia Revolutionary Organization –   
     People’s Party  
Macedonia (2014)   Internal Macedonia Revolutionary Organization – Democratic Party for Macedonia National   
     Unity; Democratic Union for Integration; Internal Macedonia Revolutionary Organization –   
     People’s Party 
Macedonia (2016)   Internal Macedonia Revolutionary Organization – Democratic Party for Macedonia National   
     Unity; Democratic Union for Integration 
Madagascar (2013)   N/A 
Malawi (2014)   Congress Party 
Malaysia (2013)   United Malays National Organization; Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party 
Maldives (2014)   Progressive Party of Maldives; Adhaalath Party 
Mali (2013)     N/A 
Malta (2013)    Nationalist Party 
Mauritania (2013)   Union for the Republic; Union for Democracy and Progress 
Mauritius (2014)   Mauritian Solidarity Front 
Mexico (2012)   National Action Party 
Mexico (2015)   National Action Party 
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Moldova (2014)   N/A 
Monaco (2013)   N/A 
Mongolia (2012)   N/A 
Mongolia (2016)   N/A 
Montenegro (2012)   N/A 
Montenegro (2016)   N/A 
Montserrat (2014)   N/A 
Morocco (2011)   Justice and Development Party; Istiqlal 
Morocco (2016)   Justice and Development Party; Istiqlal 
Mozambique (2014)   Democratic Movement of Mozambique 
Myanmar (2015)   N/A 
Namibia (2014)   N/A 
Netherlands (2012)   Christian Democratic Appeal; Reformed Political Party; Christian Union 
Netherlands Antilles (2012)  N/A 
New Caledonia (2014)  The Rally-UMP; Caledonian Union-FLINKS 
New Zealand (2011)   N/A 
New Zealand (2014)   N/A 
Nicaragua (2011)   N/A 
Nicaragua (2016)   N/A 
Niger (2011)    N/A 
Niger (2016)    N/A 
Nigeria (2011)   N/A 
Nigeria (2015)   N/A 
Northern Cyprus (2013)  N/A 
Norway (2013)   Christian Democratic Party; The Christians 
Pakistan (2013) Pakistan Muslim League; Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf; Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam; Pakistan Muslim League 
(Quaid e Azam Group); Pakistan Muslim League (F); Jamaat-e-Islami; Mutahida Deeni Mahaz 
Panama (2014)   People’s Party 
Papua New Guinea (2012)  Triumph Heritage Empowerment Party 
Paraguay (2013)   Colorado Party; Beloved Fatherland Party 
Peru (2011)    Force 2011 Alliance (National Renewal); Alliance for the Great Change 
Peru (2016)    Popular Alliance 
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Philippines (2013) People-Power Christian Muslim Democrats; Philippine Democratic Party-People’s Power 
Philippines (2016)   People-Power Christian Muslim Democrats; Philippine Democratic Party-People’s Power 
Poland (2011)    Civic Platform; Law and Justice; Polish People’s Party; Poland Comes First 
Poland (2015)    Law and Justice; Civic Platform; Polish People’s Party  
Portugal (2011)   Social Democratic Party; People’s Party 
Portugal (2015)   Portugal Ahead 
Puerto Rico (2012)   N/A 
Romania (2012)   Right Romania Alliance; Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania; Greater Romania Party;   
     Hungarian People’s Party of Transylvania 
Romania (2016) National Liberal Party; Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania; People’s Movement Party; Greater 
Romania Party 
Russia (2011)    N/A 
Russia (2016)    N/A 
Rwanda (2013)   Patriotic Front Coalition 
St. Kitts & Nevis (2015)  N/A 
St. Lucia (2011)   N/A 
St. Vincent & the Grenadines (2015) N/A 
Samoa (2011)    N/A 
Samoa (2016)    N/A 
San Marino (2012)   Sammarinese Christian Democratic Party; Union for the Republic  
Sao Tome & Principe (2014)  Independent Democratic Action 
Senegal (2012)   N/A 
Serbia (2012)    Democratic Party of Serbia, Dveri 
Serbia (2014)    Democratic Party of Serbia; Dveri 
Serbia (2016)    Dveri; Justice and Reconciliation Party 
Seychelles (2011)   N/A 
Seychelles (2016)   N/A 
Sierra Leone (2012)   N/A 
Singapore (2011)   N/A 
Singapore (2015)   N/A 
Slovakia (2012)   Christian Democratic Movement; Slovak Democratic and Christian Union-Democratic Party;   
     Slovak National Party; Party of the Hungarian Community 
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Slovakia (2016) Ordinary People; Slovak National Party; Christian Democratic Movement; Party of the Hungarian 
Community 
Slovenia (2011)   Slovenian People’s Party; New Slovenia 
Slovenia (2014)   New Slovenia; Slovenian People’s Party 
Solomon Islands (2014)  N/A 
South Africa (2014)   Freedom Front Plus 
South Korea (2012)   N/A 
South Korea (2016)   Christian Liberal Party 
Spain (2011)    People’s Party; Convergence and Union; Basque Nationalist Party 
Spain (2015)    People’s Party; Basque Nationalist Party 
Spain (2016)    People’s Party; Basque Nationalist Party 
Sri Lanka (2015)   United National Front for Good Governance; Sri Lanka Muslim Congress; All Ceylon Makkal   
     Congress 
Sudan (2015)    National Congress 
Suriname (2015)   N/A 
Sweden (2014)   Christian Democrats 
Switzerland (2011)   Christian Democratic People’s Party; Evangelical People’s Party 
Switzerland (2015)   Christian Democratic People’s Party; Evangelical People’s Party; Federal Democratic Union 
Syria (2012)    N/A 
Taiwan (2012)   Kuomintang 
Taiwan (2016)   Kuomintang; Faith and Hope League 
Tajikistan (2015)   Islam Renaissance Party 
Tanzania (2015)   N/A 
Thailand (2011)   N/A 
Thailand (2014)   N/A 
Timor-Leste (2012)   N/A 
Togo (2013)    N/A 
Tonga (2014)    N/A 
Trinidad & Tobago (2015)  N/A 
Tunisia (2011)   Ennahda Movement 
Tunisia (2014)   Ennahda Movement 
Turkey (2011)    Justice and Development Party; Felicity Party; Great Unity Party; People’s Voice Party 
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Turkey (2015, June)   Justice and Development Party; Felicity Party 
Turkey (2015, November)  Justice and Development Party; Felicity Party; Great Unity Party 
Turkmenistan (2013)   N/A 
Turks & Caicos (2012)  N/A 
Uganda (2011)   N/A 
Uganda (2016)   N/A 
Ukraine (2012)   All-Ukrainian Union “Fatherland”; Freedom 
Ukraine (2014)   Self Reliance; All-Ukrainian Union “Fatherland”; Freedom  
United Kingdom (2015)  N/A 
United States (2012)   Constitution Party 
United States (2014)   Constitution Party 
United States (2016)   Constitution Party 
Uruguay (2014)   Independent Party 
Uzbekistan (2014)   N/A 
Vanuatu (2012)   N/A 
Vanuatu (2016)   N/A 
Venezuela (2015)   N/A 
Zambia (2011)   N/A 
Zambia (2016)   N/A 
Zimbabwe (2013)   N/A 
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Table 2: Poisson Regression Models of the Number of Religious Parties Contesting Elections and Finishing in the Top-Ten Places 
 
                    Model       
Variables       1  2  3  4  5  6 
Religious Diversity (Pew)     -0.32 (0.14)* 
Religious Diversity (Alesina et al.)      -0.18 (0.08)* 
Religious Diversity (WCD, 1900)       -0.14 (0.24) 
Religious Diversity (WCD, 1970)         -0.45 (0.24)+ 
Religious Diversity (WCD, 2000)           -0.47 (0.20)* 
Religious Diversity (WCD, 2010)             -0.52 (0.20)* 
District Magnitude (Logged)    0.14 (0.06)* 0.15 (0.06)* 0.16 (0.06)* 0.19 (0.06)* 0.18 (0.06)* 0.16 (0.06)* 
Proportional Upper Tiers    0.35 (0.30) 0.50 (0.31) 0.39 (0.32) 0.49 (0.31) 0.44 (0.29) 0.41 (0.29) 
Two-Round Majority System    0.20 (0.31) 0.29 (0.29) 0.32 (0.30) 0.41 (0.29) 0.34 (0.28) 0.23 (0.29) 
State-Supported Religion    0.24 (0.21) 0.25 (0.22) 0.33 (0.23) 0.24 (0.22) 0.25 (0.21) 0.27 (0.21) 
% No Religion     -0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01)+ -0.02 (0.01)* -0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) 
Ethnic Diversity     -0.13 (0.08)+ -0.14 (0.08)+ -0.19 (0.08)* -0.16 (0.08)* -0.14 (0.07)+ -0.13 (0.07)+ 
GDP per capita (Logged)    0.08 (0.09) 0.06 (0.08) 0.05 (0.08) 0.01 (0.08) 0.03 (0.08) 0.06 (0.08) 
Democracy (Polity)     0.07 (0.03)* 0.08 (0.03)* 0.08 (0.03)* 0.07 (0.03)* 0.07 (0.03)* 0.07 (0.03)* 
Constant      -0.27 (0.73) -0.41 (0.65) -0.38 (0.70)* 0.37 (0.80) 0.21 (0.73) 0.06 (0.70) 
Wald χ2       69.84*  67.40*  62.72*  66.64*  65.82*  69.96* 
McFadden’s R2      0.16  0.15  0.15  0.16  0.16  0.16 
n (Countries)      130  130  130  130  130  130 
n (Total)      168  168  168  168  168  168 
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, two-tailed tests.  Entries are Poisson regression coefficients with standard errors clustered by country presented in 
parentheses. “WCD” = World Christian Database.   
 
Figure 1: Distribution of the Number of Religious Parties Among the Top Ten Largest Parties 
in Elections Around the World 
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Figure 2: The Predicted Numbers of Religious Parties Finishing in the Top Ten Places across 
the Range of Religious Diversity 
 
 
 
Notes: solid black lines represent the predicted number of religious parties, while the areas 
shaded in grey represent 95% confidence intervals.   
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